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Abstract Competent public agencies are associated with better economic outcomes. Be-
yond competence, political leaders need to secure the loyalty of their agencies. Unfortu-
nately, several theories predict a tradeoff between these two valued features. This paper
finds that recruitment into agencies is meritocratic where (1) agency officials have poor out-
side options, (2) careers in agencies are long-lasting, and (3) agency loyalty is important.
Moreover, agency competence is lower when (4) loyalty is important but the time horizon is
short, and (5) outside opportunities improve but the time horizon is long. This evidence fits
best with a theory of loyalty as non-contractible behavior.
Keywords Public agencies · Political economy · Loyalty
JEL Classification H1 · M5 · P1
1 Introduction
Loyalty of public agencies to the government (and in particular the prime minister or other
head of the government) is valued highly. Anecdotal evidence for the US from Wilson (1989:
198) suggests that agency executives and their staff “are selected in order to serve the po-
litical needs of the president, and these may or may not involve policy considerations.”
Governments are also interested in other types of loyalty, e.g., the absence of bribery and
corruption.
Unfortunately, anecdotal observation also suggests that agency loyalty does not always
come without costs. For example, the governmental appointment process is frequently re-
garded as being strongly dominated by considerations of loyalty, at the cost of competence
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(Edwards 2001). Some argue that this leads to “amateur government” (Cohen 1998). In-
deed, Heclo (1977: 99) observed that “many of [the agency’s executive’s] selectors [are]
more interested in the process of getting their way than in the executive’s eventual output.”
If competence of agencies is lower, economic growth and performance will suffer. This
appears to be a problem of interest not only in developing countries. For example, some
observers worried about the value US President George W. Bush and his administration ap-
peared to put on loyalty. Obviously, this academic paper does not take a partisan point of
view. But consider this excerpt from an interview (on November 11, 2004) with Katrina
Vanden Heuvel on “Paula Zahn Now,” a prime time show on CNN”:1
Zahn: “Let’s move on to another controversy brewing in the Bush administration.
There are a lot of critics out there suggesting that, in moving the kind of people the
Bush administration is into the Cabinet positions, you’re doing it not because of com-
petency, but out of loyalty, leading to what they say will be a dangerous group think
mentality. Do you see it that way?”
Vanden Heuvel: “Yes. Paula, if competence was an issue here, you wouldn’t see any
of these people in this administration.”
Whether or not one agrees with Vanden Heuvel’s response, both Zahn and Vanden Heuvel
appear to believe in the premise—that there is a tradeoff between loyalty and competence.
This paper studies whether the concern voiced in this exchange is mirrored systematically
in evidence on competence in public agencies in a cross-section of countries.
Although the primary focus of the paper is empirical, it is useful to guide the statistical
analysis with theory. Recent theoretical research in organizational economics and politi-
cal economy has unearthed reasons why a tradeoff between loyalty and competence may
arise as the optimal solution to an agency problem (Egorov and Sonin 2006; Glazer 2002;
Wagner 2006). To test the hypotheses that flow from these and other models, this paper
employs a dataset on important state economic agencies (ministries and central banks) in
semi-industrialized and developing countries, compiled by Evans and Rauch (1999) and
Rauch and Evans (2000). The empirical analysis reveals that governments choose to have
highly competent officials in their agencies (as measured by the prevalence of civil service
exams for top officials) (1) where officials have few private sector contacts and are less
likely to retire to jobs in the private sector, (2) where careers in agencies are expected to be
long-lasting, and (3) where the agencies are powerful, i.e., where their loyalty is important.
Moreover, competence is lower (4) when loyalty is important but simultaneously the time
horizon is short, and (5) when outside opportunities improve but simultaneously the time
horizon is long. Although not all estimates are statistically significant in all regressions,
overall these findings are consistent with a model of loyalty as a non-contractible behavior
along the lines of Wagner (2006), while they are harder to reconcile with or are in contrast
to predictions of other theories. As such, to my knowledge, this paper offers the first test
of conflicting theories of loyalty and competence.2 Additionally, the empirics suggest that
a greater extent of political appointment is associated with less meritocratic recruitment.
These results are obtained controlling for country variables such how long civil service ex-
ams have been in place, human capital (educational attainment), development level (GDP
p.c.), and other factors.
1The transcript is at http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0411/19/pzn.01.html.
2Other work has explored the empirical content of general theories of loyalty. For example, Verwimp (2003)
uses the model of Wintrobe (1998) to help in understanding the regime in Rwanda that first aimed to buy
political loyalty and then turned to repression.
Public Choice (2011) 146: 145–162 147
The question of what factors are associated with greater competence in the public sector
is important for the understanding of cross-country differences in economic performance.
For example, Rauch and Evans (2000) find that meritocratic recruitment is a statistically
significant determinant of ratings by country risk agencies. Evans (1995) argues, following
Max Weber, that replacement of a patronage system for state officials by a professional state
bureaucracy is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a state to grow economically.
Evans and Rauch (1999) indeed find that more “Weberian” agencies (including those that
have meritocractic recruitment) allow countries to achieve greater economic growth. This
paper, thus, takes it as given that greater competence in agencies increases output, and it aims
to determine which institutional factors go hand in hand with higher competence in public
agencies. That is, it considers the choice of the recruitment mechanism as endogenous. By
recognizing that competence can, under some conditions, have a cost, namely, endogenously
lower loyalty, the paper also adds to the literature on “new public management” which has,
so far, mostly focused on explicit mechanisms like performance-based pay and tournaments
as tools for eliciting better performance from agents (Aucoin 1990; Caiden 1988).3
The present paper considers the interaction between a central government and its
agencies. As such, it is closely related to the important bureaucracy literature in pub-
lic choice that studies agencies and a sponsor such as a government or a legislature.4
A vast literature exists on this subject, and it is impossible to review it comprehen-
sively here. (For a textbook treatment, see Mueller 2003; for surveys, see Wintrobe 1997;
Niskanen 2001 and Chang et al. 2001.) One view asserts that the expertise of agencies is
superior to the legislature, thus leading to inefficient allocations when the bureaucrat wishes
to maximize the budget (Niskanen 1971).5 Others have considered a slack-maximizing bu-
reaucracy (Wyckoff 1990). Dunleavy (1985, 1991) instead develops the “bureau-shaping”
idea according to which bureaucrats want to shape their agency so as to maximize their
personal utilities from their work (and not necessarily the budget). All these motivations
of agency officials are important reasons why and how the government offers rewards for
agency loyalty.
Section 2 begins by reviewing the theoretical background and key predictions. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Hypothesis development
The paper’s contribution is primarily empirical. Nonetheless, it is helpful to structure the
discussion along some recent theories, in order to be able to derive some specific hypotheses.
3Using civil service exams as a recruitment tool can, of course, impose significant rent-seeking costs on
society. Test-takers will allocate their time and effort away from productive activities in order to master
the material on which they will be examined, and educational institutions will teach to the test if they are
evaluated on the basis of how many of their graduates pass civil service or other exams.
4Other seminal work has considered the economics within agencies. Tullock (1965) formulated a model of
the relations between individuals within a bureaucracy, focusing on the advancement and promotion proce-
dures within bureaus. Downs (1967) also considered the management process within agencies, and he also
presented an evolutionary or longitudinal premise by tracing the political “life” of a bureau over time, i.e., a
life-cycle. An extreme version of the power of the bureaucracy is reflected in Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980)
Leviathan model, where the bureaucracy and the legislature are one monolithic agent who exploits his power
over the citizenry.
5The inefficiency is reduced when the sponsor can partially monitor or penalize the bureau and the bureaucrat
is risk-averse (Bendor et al. 1985) or when the sponsor can conceal its demand from the bureau (Miller and
Moe 1983). See also Makris (2006) for a recent analysis that suggests that the outcome may be more efficient
than usually assumed.
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2.1 Basic framework
Consider a central government that charges an agency with delivering some output.6 For
the purposes of the present paper and the empirical predictions, we will focus on the gov-
ernment’s problem of choosing whom to recruit into the high positions in public agencies.7
Let us assume that the government is a unitary actor that can choose the hiring rules for
its agencies and that it has some incentive to have agencies provide high-quality service.8
For example, agencies with more meritocratic recruitment to the top provide better public
goods and allow the economy to grow faster. One way to secure competence in agencies is
to require formal exams to enter civil service or at least before entering a high-level position.
Not all of the needs of the government or of the agency executives themselves are covered
by having highly able agency officials. Beyond competence, the government is also inter-
ested in making sure that agency executives and employees act loyally to the government’s
needs. Loyalty in this context is taken to mean two things in particular: first, not pushing for
policies that are against the central government’s plans, and, second, not engaging in illegal
side activities.9 But both types of loyal actions—voluntarily chosen alignment in policy and
minimization of illegal activity—bring (opportunity) costs with them for officials, whether
or not the actions are socially efficient. Thus, the government will have to promise rewards,
such as support in hard times for the agency, larger budgets, the opportunity to shape the bu-
reau as desired, or an opportunity for agency officers to rise through the government ranks.10
This interaction takes place over time.11
2.2 Models of loyalty and competence
This basic framework can be used to understand the different predictions of various mod-
els which I now adapt to the context of public agencies. Unfortunately, because of the very
different natures of the existing models (which comprise static and dynamic, complete, in-
complete, and asymmetric information sets, and so on), no unified theoretical treatment
seems feasible. Instead, I proceed with a verbal discussion of each model and refer to the
underlying papers for details.
6This analysis takes as given the notion that the government decentralizes at least some decisions. See
Seabright (1996), Laffont and Martimort (1998), Laffont and Zantman (2002) for discussions on this point.
See Borge et al. (2008) for an analysis of the relationship between party fragmentation and efficiency of
institutions.
7The models presented later also apply within agencies and bureaus and, as such, also relate to the work
by Tullock (1965) and Downs (1967). However, data to test the models within organizations are not usually
available. See Breton (1995) for a collection of other agency models helpful in understanding “agency within
agencies.” An especially complex question, neglected here, is ensuring appropriate behavior in hierarchies,
i.e., settings with three or more layers. See Tirole (1986, 1992) and Vafaï (2002, 2005).
8Even a government that steals all the agencies’ production is interested in their competence. In all but the
most autocratic societies, there is also at least some degree of accountability of government, and to the extent
that ultimately the government has to fear revolution or being thrown out of office democratically if it does
not provide the services its citizens desire, it will maintain a sufficiently high level of agency competence.
9As shown in Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), corruption is very hard to eradicate solely by raising wages.
10This assumes away intrinsic motivations of bureaucrats and other aspects of motives in bureaucracies.
See Wise (2004) for a comprehensive review of work on these issues. In addition, the analysis assumes
away monitoring and auditing as key tools of governance within organizations and between. See Baron and
Besanko (1984), Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) and Dittman (1999) for formal models of auditing.
11Other channels through which the time horizon matters have also been developed. For example, see Konrad
and Torsvik (1997) for a model of term limits when information revelation is the economic problem.
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Let us begin by considering Wagner’s (2006) model. The key assumption there is that
both loyalty and rewards are non-contractible and that their exchange thus needs to be sus-
tained through repeated interaction. In trying to induce officials to exhibit loyalty by reward-
ing them properly, the government faces the problem that more competent agency officials
have better side opportunities (some of which are exactly the sort of illegal activity the gov-
ernment wants to prevent). In particular, it is likely that more competent agency officials are
better able to find opportunities for accepting bribes. They are more effective at search for
side opportunities, they may be able to detect loopholes in the legal system, and they receive
more offers because their services are of greater value to those who pay the bribe. Moreover,
for a given strength of the contacts between the private and public sectors, more competent
officials also have better outside options in the private sector if they are fired or retire. Both
observations imply that more competent officials have a more attractive reneging path and
are, therefore, less easily induced to foregoing their preferred choice of independent (dis-
loyal) action, be it their own preferred policy or illegal side activities. This makes it difficult
to sustain loyalty with highly competent officials. Several predictions for the government’s
choice of the level of competence of agency officials follow from this model:
A. Competence is lower where there are better side opportunities (illegal activities or private
sector options).
The reason is that when more side opportunities are available, competence is even more
productive outside, making loyalty harder to obtain with high competence, thus leading to a
decrease in optimal competence for a desired level of loyalty.
B. Competence is higher where public sector careers are expected to last longer.
Competence will be higher if individuals are more patient, because a self-enforcing con-
tract such as loyalty becomes more easily sustainable over time.
C. Competence increases as the value of loyalty increases.
This last prediction is at first surprising. It arises in Wagner’s model because the greater
the value of loyalty to the principal, the more credibly he can promise rewards. If, by con-
trast, loyalty generates only a small surplus, the government can only promise rewards that
suffice to induce less competent staff and executives to behave loyally.
The theoretical model also has predictions for interaction terms.
D. The interaction between side opportunities and length of expected interaction reduces
competence.
E. The interaction between the value of loyalty and length of expected interaction increases
competence.
The logic behind these two predictions is the following. When the duration of interaction
is longer, competence is, ceteris paribus, higher (prediction B). According to prediction A,
as side opportunities become greater, the deviation temptation becomes greater, decreasing
optimal competence. Thus, with a long duration of interaction, the detrimental effect of an
increase in side opportunities is larger than if competence is already relatively small (which
is the case when the duration of interaction is short). The opposite holds for the value of
loyalty.
Another directly relevant and intuitively appealing model of loyalty and competence is
Egorov and Sonin (2006). In their model, more competent viziers are more prone to trea-
son. The reason is that they are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, mak-
ing them more risky subordinates for the ruler because the ruler has to fear that the better
informed advisor misinforms him. Therefore, dictators may prefer incompetent viziers. In-
centive schemes by the dictator find limitations in the likelihood that the government itself
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remains in place. The authors finetune their model to the context of dictatorships, but they
also discuss its assumptions and implications relative to the other papers mentioned here.
Indeed, the basic insights apply to the relationship between a central government and an
agency; or even more generally to any organization where the center has agents that may
try to usurp the central power through misinformation. Egorov and Sonin predict that where
loyalty is more important (in the terminology of their paper, where the stakes are high for the
dictator), the agent should be less competent. As discussed above, Wagner’s model instead
suggests that more valuable loyalty makes loyalty more easily implementable even with
competent agencies, leading to a positive correlation between the value of loyalty and com-
petence. Egorov and Sonin’s second main result is that the principal’s commitment ability in
terms of being able to threaten capital punishment for a revolutionary vizier determines op-
timal vizier competence. This result is similar to the prediction of Wagner’s model that the
expected length of interactions increases optimal competence. Egorov and Sonin’s theory
does not speak to the role of side opportunities.
In Glazer’s (2002) model, an owner of an organization wants a worker to engage in pro-
ducing benefits for his firm (“external rent-seeking” in Glazer’s terminology), but is worried
that the worker instead focuses on internal rent-seeking. Again the model is sufficiently gen-
eral to apply to the present context. Glazer finds that an employer will hire better staff the
stiffer the competition for external rents. The primary prediction that distinguishes his model
from Wagner’s is that in Glazer’s analysis the larger the assets subject to rent-seeking (i.e.,
the more important loyalty is for the owner), the smaller is the desired quality of staff. On the
other hand, the model is also different from Egorov and Sonin’s world because commitment
ability does not play a role; Glazer’s approach thus has no predictions for the effect of the
discount factor on optimal competence. Finally, Glazer’s model also yields no predictions
for the role of side opportunities.12
A final alternative (which is so simple that no one seems to have bothered with writing
it down) would be a static multi-tasking model where more competent officials again have
better side opportunities but where these can be part of a contract. Only prediction (C)
could follow from a contractible loyalty model. Predictions (B) and (E) do not arise in
this static framework. Without further complications, such a model also does not yield a
relationship between the available side opportunities and competence (predictions (A) and
(D)). The labor market would price competence into the wage offered to an agent, making
the participation constraint of the agent more binding. The ultimate effect is that competence
is irrelevant for the principal, after deducting the costs of employing a more competent agent.
In the light of these analytically plausible, but partially conflicting or complementary
predictions, it is an empirical question as to which theory can best explain the available
evidence.13
12Glazer’s model does have interesting testable predictions for the effect of the owner’s competence on the
worker’s competence, but to test these would require information about the ability of the government, which
is not available.
13This is not a complete list of economic theories that speak to the tradeoff between loyalty and competence.
Prendergast and Topel (1996) show that a principal who values the power to affect his agent’s welfare may
prefer less competent agents, and Friebel and Raith (2004) posit that a manager may fear competent subor-
dinates because they may wish to take his post. These models can explain an inverse relationship between
loyalty and competence but have no other predictions that can be tested with the present data. The reason is
that the Friebel and Raith model assumes that the middle manager chooses different hiring standards for his
subordinates than top management uses for the middle manager. By contrast, in the present dataset, we have
information only about the overall use of entrance exams for the most important positions in agencies. The
Prendergast and Topel model is also more about the misallocation of talent within organizations rather than
about the overall level of talent.
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3 Data and methodology
Measuring the concepts that feature in the theoretical models is difficult, and any mea-
surement is likely to be incomplete at best. Still, a dataset compiled and thankfully made
publicly available by Evans and Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Evans (2000) contains a
rich set of variables that allow an econometric analysis of the above relationships. De-
tailed information on the dataset is provided in the codebook (available for download at
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jrauch/webstate/) and in the original papers. The Appendix to this
paper contains the country list and a mapping of my variables to the Evans and Rauch data.
Evans and Rauch constructed their data from questionnaires sent to country experts in 35
semi-industrialized nations. Experts were first asked to name the most important agencies
in their country.14 The experts then answered questions concerning the hiring mechanisms,
career perspectives, etc. The experts did not disaggregate their answers according to the
various agencies, but rather referred to “these agencies” in all their answers. Each variable
is categorical for individual expert answers, but Evans and Rauch average the answers of
country experts so that the data are close to continuous for most variables.
The rationale for using this sample is similar to that of Evans and Rauch (1999: 754).
An advantage of studying the countries at hand is that it is a relatively homogenous sample
that allows studying variation in agency competence among semi-industrialized countries
rather than between developing and advanced industrial countries. Also, there is likely to
be more variation in the relevant variables among semi-industrialized countries than among
industrialized countries. Despite the appeal of using this dataset, however, the results should
be interpreted as carefully as those of other cross-country studies with limited samples.
3.1 Dependent variable
Individual competence of high-level executives is not measured in the data. However, experts
provided information on what proportion of the higher officials in the agencies enter the civil
service via a formal examination system. The variable EXAMS contains this information. Of
course, it is not entirely obvious that the extent of the prevalence of formal civil service
examinations increases individuals’ competencies. But it seems likely that it at least shifts
the distribution in the right direction. As an alternative variable, I use UNIVERSITY which
measures the education of those that do not enter through examinations. Information on how
selective exams are (e.g., the pass rate) is not included in the data.
3.2 Key explanatory variables
I measure officials’ temptations for disloyalty in two ways. The first measure for side op-
portunities is given by PRIVATESECTOR, which measures how common it is for higher
officials in these agencies to spend substantial proportions of their careers in the private
sector. The rationale for using this variable derives from the notion that in countries where
private and public sector activities are significantly interspersed, more competent officials
14In total, 126 experts participated in the study. The number of expert survey respondents per country varies
and is reported in Rauch and Evans (2000: 69). See the Appendix for the instructions given to the experts.
Ranked by their average importance (between 1 and 4) as determined by the experts, the agencies are: Min-
istry of Finance, 3.11, Planning Ministry, 1.94, President’s or Prime Minister’s Office/Royal Palace, 1.60,
Central Bank, 1.57, Trade Ministry, 1.49, Other, 1.09, Ministry of Economics, 0.71, Monetary Authority,
0.23, Defense Ministry, 0.20.
152 Public Choice (2011) 146: 145–162
are more able to leverage their skills in current side activities or in future outside activi-
ties, thus increasing officials’ payoffs on the reneging path. I also use PRIVATE-RETIRE
in a robustness test. This variable measures how common it is for higher officials to have
significant post-retirement careers in the private sector.
Second, agency officials can engage in illegal activities and collect bribes or other extra
income. The Evans and Rauch data contain information on how legal salaries compare to
private sector salaries (RELATIVE SALARY) as well as how total income (legal plus illegal
income) compares to the private sector (RELATIVE SALARY WITH BRIBES). These com-
parisons are not given in monetary terms but in terms of ranks, but they are still informative.
The difference between these two variables, BRIBES, gives an (approximate) measure of
the side opportunities. Note that BRIBES does not measure loyalty or disloyalty (as a behav-
ior); rather, it measures the opportunity cost of loyalty. More competent officials plausibly
have more side opportunities, and these are opportunities the official can engage in while
remaining employed at the agency. Some of these illegal activities may be avoided by hav-
ing explicit laws against them, and it is likely that the countries are doing what they can to
limit corruption. But imperfect law enforcement makes it plausible that at least some part of
side opportunities remains that cannot be contracted away; indeed, BRIBES is almost always
strictly positive in the sample.15 As a proxy for discounting, SHORTTIMEHORIZON mea-
sures the modal number of years spent by a typical higher level official in the agencies over
his career. This variable, which henceforth is abbreviated as SHORT, is equal to 1 when the
time horizon is shorter than 10 years, and 0 when it is longer than 10 years. TIMEHORIZON
is a variable that splits these two groups into two additional groups each, resulting in four
categories (1–5 years, 5–10 years, 10–20 years, 20 years or longer). The results are robust
to using this definition.
Finally, measuring the value of loyalty is perhaps the most challenging task, and I recog-
nize the limitations any proposed measure must bring with it. In line with the theoretical
discussion above, the value of loyalty to the government is at least co-determined by the
costs of securing policy alignment. This suggests that an appropriate measure of the value
of loyalty is the power of agencies. I use two variables: First, POWER measures how likely it
is that ideas and policies initiated by the agencies prevail. According to the experts’ opinions,
no agency in the sample can prevail against the explicit will of the government; however, it
costs the top executive political capital to force a decision.
Second, I create an interaction term between POWER and a measure of how many poli-
cies the agency is in fact responsible for (POLICIES). Intuitively, if an agency is responsible
for many issues and can hold up the government when it withholds its approval, the loy-
alty of the agency executive and his staff is important. This interaction term then constitutes
my variable VALUE OF LOYALTY, which henceforth is abbreviated as LVALUE. The main
analysis is conducted with LVALUE, but all the results also hold if I use POWER instead.
15One theoretical concern might be the following: If one aspect of loyalty is the absence of bribes, and we
still observe a positive level of bribes in the data, does that not imply that agents do not act loyally? After all,
all the models’ predictions above are equilibrium predictions that apply when the principal obtains at least
partial loyalty. There are several responses to this issue. First, loyalty has multiple dimensions, only one of
which is the absence of bribes. Second, the very presence of bribes suggests that it is difficult to get rid of them
with laws (which are in place in virtually all of the countries analyzed). Where the temptation for accepting
bribes is higher, they will be accepted, thus inducing the need for lower competence in order to somewhat
limit, but not extinguish, bribery. Of course, if the governing regime itself is corrupt, then corruption on the
part of agencies may be an act of loyalty.
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3.3 Control variables
I also control for additional variables that do not play an explicit role in the theoretical model
but can be hypothesized to affect the choice of recruiting systems in public agencies. First,
I employ a measure of the size of the pool of competence from which agency officials can
be drawn. For this, I use a proxy for human capital in the economy. If we did not control
for human capital, that would be an easy explanation for why an agency just cannot use
civil service exams to select between potential officials. I use the standard measure for ed-
ucational attainment, the Barro and Lee (1993) measure of the average schooling years in
the total population over age 25. In the tables presented here, I use educational attainment
from 1970, but the results are not substantively affected if I instead use the numbers from
1990. It would be nice to control for the fungibility of human capital in agencies (for exam-
ple, the proportion of lawyers). Unfortunately, this information is not readily available for a
sufficiently large sample of countries.
Not all countries have the same history of using civil service exams. While all coun-
tries except Argentina have had civil service examinations in place since the 1970s at the
latest, there is some variation in countries’ length of experience with this governance tool.
Thus, I control for a variable (from Evans and Rauch’s experts) that summarizes this history,
HISTORYCIVIL. I expect that countries with a longer history of using civil service exams
generally are also more likely to use these exams for the higher positions in agencies.
To further minimize the problem that the regressions may be picking up other country
fixed effects, I also include a measure of the country’s development, namely, GDP per capita,
from the Penn World Tables. The regressions in the paper use the level from 1970, but the
results hold if I instead use data from 1990 as well.
Moreover, I control for how many of the top levels in the agencies are in fact political
appointees (POLAPP). It is likely that a country with more political appointees is more
resistant to an exams-based system.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for all variables are contained in Table 1 (at the end of the paper).
A few observations are in order. First, all of the agencies that Evans’ and Rauch’s experts
provided data for are important in the sense that none of them just implements policy dic-
tated from above. Second, without exception, in all agencies, there is at least some degree of
political appointment of executives and high officials; often, this goes even into the second
and third levels of the hierarchy.16
3.5 Estimation strategy and limitations
The generic regression I run is the following:
EXAMSi = a + b ∗ LVALUEi + c ∗ SHORT i + d ∗ (LVALUEi ∗ SHORT i )
+ e ∗ OUTSIDEOPTIONSi + f ∗ (OUTSIDEOPTIONSi ∗ SHORT i )
+ g ∗ CONTROLSi
16These two facts can be seen from noting that the minimum values of the variables “Number of policies”
and “Extent of political appointment” are 2, not 1.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max
Dev.
EXAMS: Formal exams for high officials 35 2.17 1.00 1.00 4.00
POLICIES: Number of policies originating in agencies 35 2.27 0.43 1.50 3.00
POWER: Power of agencies 35 1.95 0.26 1.33 2.40
LVALUE: Value of loyalty 35 4.46 1.20 2.44 6.24
SHORT: Short time horizon 35 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Value of loyalty * Short time horizon 35 1.95 2.46 0.00 6.24
HISTORYCIVIL: History of civil service 35 4.19 0.98 1.00 6.00
POLAPP: Extent of political appointment 35 3.11 0.59 1.50 4.00
PRIVATESECTOR: Private sector contacts 35 2.46 0.89 1.00 4.00
BRIBES: Extra income from bribes etc. 35 1.06 0.97 −0.50 2.83
Extra income from bribes * short time horizon 35 0.46 0.89 −0.50 2.67
GDP per capita 1970 35 2422.49 1502.31 586.00 6004.00
Human capital 1970 35 3.36 1.74 0.90 7.62
Note: Variables in CAPITAL letters are from Evans and Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Evans (2000). The
other variables are created as described in the Appendix. GDP p.c. is from the Penn World Tables, and human
capital is from Barro and Lee (1993)
where OUTSIDEOPTIONS are either PRIVATESECTOR or BRIBES and where CONTROLS
comprise available human capital in the economy, level of development, the history of civil
service exams, and the extent of political appointment. Being the average of opinions, EX-
AMS has many categories, and so I employ OLS estimation with heteroscedasticity con-
sistent standard errors. In the above regression, Wagner’s (2006) model leads us to expect
b > 0, c < 0, d < 0, e < 0, f > 0, Egorov and Sonin’s (2006) model implies b < 0, c < 0,
Glazer’s (2002) model implies b < 0, and the contractible loyalty model implies b > 0.
I highlight for the reader a limitation of this empirical approach. Because of the cross-
sectional nature of the data, addressing endogeneity is very difficult. If we had time-series
data, we could employ a fixed effects estimator to address the potential concern of an omitted
variable bias, but such data are not available. Of course, the cleanest approach to clarifying
causality would be an instrumental variables estimation. This would require the availability
of a valid instrument, i.e., an exogenous variable that affects, for example, the value of loy-
alty, but has no effect on competence in agencies through other channels except for its effect
on the value of loyalty. But such a variable is very hard to find.17 While this limitation is not
to be taken lightly, one might first note that the first generation of the empirical literature on
economic growth proceeded along these lines even though the authors at the time were, of
course, also aware of the limitations of their approach. Second, and less defensively, the im-
portance of the question of what factors are associated with competence in public agencies
compels the researcher to use data to make the best inferences possible with them. At the
very least, therefore, the paper provides novel evidence on the correlations between relevant
17I report results with legal origin as a potential instrumental variable in the text below, but on theoretical
grounds, this seems a problematic instrument, even if the empirical effects in the second stage regression come
out nicely. After all, it is quite possible that legal origin is related directly to different types of recruitment in
different countries.
Public Choice (2011) 146: 145–162 155
Table 2 Correlations between the dependent variable and key explanatory variables
1 2 3 4 5
EXAMS: Formal exams 1.000
LVALUE: Value of loyalty 0.160 1.000
SHORT: Short time horizon −0.309 0.070 1.000
PRIVATESECTOR: Private sector contacts −0.521 −0.111 0.471 1.000
BRIBES: Extra income through bribes −0.414 −0.397 −0.023 0.057 1.000
factors of the institutional setup of economies, even if one wishes to abstain from making
statements about causality. Third, the fact that some of the explanatory variables of interest
are interaction terms makes it far less plausible that the estimates for these variables are
confounded by endogeneity.
4 Findings
Since the non-contractible loyalty model provides the most stringent set of hypotheses
testable with the data, this section organizes the evidence around this model’s predictions.
I begin by considering partial correlations of the variables of interest. These can be found
in Table 2, where the most relevant correlations highlighted in bold face.
As predicted, the value of loyalty and the time horizon are positively correlated with
competence, while outside opportunities (as measured by private sector contacts and ex-
tra income through bribes) are negatively correlated with competence. Notably, though, for
short time horizons, the correlation of the value of loyalty and competence is virtually zero,
while it is strongly positive for long time horizons; moreover, the effect of bribes is more
pronounced when interactions are long. I next test the predictions concerning the joint ef-
fects of importance of loyalty, outside opportunities, and the time horizon in a regression
framework.
Consider Table 3. While the first column shows that the value of loyalty is not signifi-
cantly related to competence on its own, the effect becomes positive and significant, consis-
tent with hypothesis (C), once we control for other variables as we move to the right in the
table, suggesting that the omission of those variables had biased downwards the coefficient
for LVALUE in the first column.
Column (2) indicates that, consistent with hypothesis (B), relatively short-term interac-
tions are associated with lower competence levels. Moreover, according to columns (3) and
(4), the interaction effect between the value of loyalty and impatience has a negative sign,
which is consistent with hypothesis (E). Thus, overall, for a short time horizon, the value
of loyalty is negatively associated with the level of competence. The theory predicts that
where interactions are too short to establish loyalty with competent agencies, governments
need to sacrifice competence in order to secure adequate levels of loyalty, and this predic-
tion is borne out in the data. The short time horizon dummy itself has a positive sign in these
two regressions, but when taking into account the interaction with the value of loyalty, the
overall marginal effect, evaluated at the mean, is negative, as predicted, and is statistically
significant.
As for the control variables, as expected, richer countries and those who have had civil
service exams in place for a longer period of time choose more stringent access rules to
the higher echelons of government. Finally, column (4) shows that, as expected, political
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Table 3 Competence in public agencies, the importance of loyalty, and the time horizon. Dependent variable:
EXAMS: Extent of formal examinations for high positions in civil service
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LVALUE: Value of loyalty (#policies * power) −0.012 0.382 0.338
(0.09) (2.86)*** (3.66)***
SHORT: Short time horizon −0.618 2.190 2.122
(2.02)* (1.66) (2.15)**
Value of loyalty * short time horizon −0.609 −0.572
(2.40)** (2.95)***
POLAPP: Extent of political appointment −0.498
of high officials (1.96)*
HISTORYCIVIL History of civil service exams 0.666 0.614 0.633 0.590
(5.34)** (4.32)*** (3.99)*** (3.89)***
GDP p.c. 1970 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.96) (1.81)* (2.42)** (3.13)***
Human capital 1970 0.063 0.071 0.031 −0.005
(0.68) (0.65) (0.30) (0.06)
Constant 3.501 3.635 1.868 3.478
(4.03)** (6.75)*** (2.19)** (3.03)***
Observations 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.43 0.52 0.63 0.70
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. *significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent
***significant at 1 percent
appointment and (more or less objective) civil service exams are incompatible. The coeffi-
cients on the value of loyalty and the interaction between the value and impatience retain
the predicted sign also with this control. This forms the preferred specification for further
analysis.
This evidence already helps us to distinguish some theories. Glazer (2002) and Egorov
and Sonin (2006) predict a negative relationship between LVALUE and EXAMS, while the
data show a positive relationship, more consistent with Wagner (2006). Both Egorov and
Sonin (2006) and Wagner (2006) predict a negative relationship between SHORT and EX-
AMS, as is observed in the data, while Glazer (2002) does not.
The findings so far could also be evidence for an alternative story, namely, that the gov-
ernment and the agencies’ officials can contract on loyalty and that loyalty and competence
are complements in production, i.e., that the value of loyalty is positively related to an agen-
cies’ competence. Thus, we would also see a positive correlation between LVALUE and
EXAMS. In other words, an unobserved variable such as the “production technology” of the
country could be driving the correlation, or there may be reverse causality. One answer to
this challenge is that even observing the correlation in the data is informative.
However, we can also make additional statements that cast some doubt on the alternative
interpretations. First, on theoretical grounds it is hard to see how loyalty of the sort relevant
here can be contracted upon in a court-enforceable way. Second, the results also hold when
the measure of the value of loyalty is POWER instead of LVALUE, and POWER would also
seem to be affected only to a small extent by the competence of the agency officials. Third,
the interaction term between LVALUE and SHORT is unlikely to be affected by endogeneity,
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Table 4 Competence in public agencies and predictions regarding the availability of outside options. Depen-
dent variable: EXAMS: Extent of formal examinations for high positions in civil service
(5) (6) (7)
PRIVATESECTOR: Outside options −0.395
(2.01)*
BRIBES: Extra income from bribes etc. −0.031 −0.338
(0.16) (1.78)*
Extra income from bribes * short time horizon 0.386
(2.05)**
LVALUE: Value of loyalty (#policies * power) 0.344 0.330 0.249
(2.95)*** (3.27)*** (2.34)**
SHORT: Short time horizon 2.375 2.103 1.268
(2.44)** (2.22)** (0.91)
Value of loyalty * short time horizon −0.574 −0.567 −0.447
(2.89)*** (3.12)*** (1.82)*
POLAPP: Extent of political −0.311 −0.495 −0.498
appointment of high officials (1.28) (1.95)* (1.82)*
HISTORYCIVIL: History of civil service exams 0.499 0.582 0.590
(4.04)*** (3.00)*** (3.04)***
GDP p.c. 1970 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.57)** (2.51)** (2.46)**
Human capital 1970 0.023 −0.001 −0.001
(0.26) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 3.401 3.525 4.228
(3.30)*** (3.11)*** (2.79)**
Observations 35 35 35
R-squared 0.78 0.70 0.72
Robust t statistics in parentheses. *significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; ***significant at
1 percent
but it is significant and goes in the direction predicted by the theory. Of course, as mentioned
earlier, we would ideally approach the issue with an instrumental variables approach. Un-
fortunately, it is very hard to come up with a valid instrument. Legal origins (see La Porta
et al. 1997a, 1997b, 1998), for example, work well from a statistical point of view—they
are highly significant in the first stage, and the significance of LVALUE is retained in the
second-stage regression. However, on economic grounds it is simply not plausible that legal
origins affect agency competence only through the importance of agency loyalty.
There is yet another way in which to make progress. In particular, the theory fortunately
has additional predictions which relate to the role of side opportunities and which do not
follow from a multi-tasking model or a model where competence is just a factor in pro-
ducing loyalty as the output. These joint predictions are tested in Table 4. Testing multiple
predictions at the same time is, even in the presence of potential endogeneity of some of the
variables, a much more difficult hurdle to clear for any theory.
Column (5) in Table 4 shows that the availability of outside options, as measured by
private sector contacts, significantly reduces the government’s optimal competence level
(hypothesis (A). This result also holds when using instead the possibility of a career in the
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private sector after retirement (not shown). Note that the value of loyalty retains the positive
sign in all regressions.
Another measure of the availability of side opportunities is the income differential be-
tween salary and salary including bribes and the difference between public and private sector
salaries. Unreported results available on request indicate that high legal pay in the public sec-
tor relative to the private sector tends to be associated with more competent agency officials,
but that where salary including bribes is high, less competent officials are observed. In some
specifications there is also a negative effect of available illegal income on optimal compe-
tence. In the main specification reported here, this direct effect is not significant, as shown
in column (6). Interestingly, though, column (7) shows that the prediction (D) concerning
the interaction between side opportunities and the time horizon is borne out in the data, and,
in fact, very strongly so. These results are important because a simple negative correlation
between the availability of extra income in the public sector and competence would also
arise in a model where agency officials are paid their marginal product in both the private
and public sectors but can receive fixed amounts of bribes in the public sector. That model
would, however, not predict the interaction effects between side opportunities and the time
horizon.
4.1 Robustness
The results also hold for an alternative dependent variable. In particular, they hold with the
proportion of those who do not enter via examinations but have university or post-graduate
degrees.
Omitting the variable measuring the history of the existence of civil service exams does
not materially change the results. (The results for side opportunities become more signifi-
cant, while the results for the value of loyalty become less significant.)
As mentioned earlier, the findings also hold controlling for GDP per capita in 1990 or
human capital in 1990. Given that the regressions control for several important country
variables, the effects found over and above this effect can most likely be attributed to the
tradeoff between loyalty and competence, especially because the theory is fairly specific in
its predictions.
The results also hold for an alternative proxy for the duration of the interaction, namely,
the extent of political dependence. This variable measures whether incumbents of top po-
sitions are likely to be moved to positions of lesser importance when leadership changes.
This measure is only informative for countries where there is a sufficient turnover in chief
executives.
Controlling for legal origin also does not change the results and is also not a signifi-
cant explanatory variable in itself. Including measures of corruption (from various sources:
Transparency International, La Porta et al. 1997a, 1997b, and Kaufmann et al. 2009) as a
control variable does not affect the results. (It cannot be used in the regression which in-
cludes the level of bribes because these two variables are highly correlated. Corruption as a
proxy for outside opportunities also fares well in the regressions, with the predicted results.)
Unfortunately, insufficient data are available to analyze competence across agencies in
the same country. This would be a fruitful area for future research. In the present analysis,
putting in dummies that capture which agency was regarded as the most important in various
countries does not substantially affect the results.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has tested various theories of competence in public agencies, with a particular
emphasis on a notion recently analyzed by Glazer (2002), Egorov and Sonin (2006) and
Wagner (2006), namely, that under some circumstances there is a tradeoff between loyalty
and competence. Using data from public agencies in a cross-section of countries, the paper
finds the following evidence: Higher competence of agency officials is observed (1) when
agency loyalty is arguably more important to the government, (2) when the time horizon for
the interactions between the government and agency officials is longer, and (3) when outside
options for agency officials are worse. Moreover, competence is lower (4) when loyalty is
important but simultaneously the time horizon is short, and (5) when outside opportunities
improve but simultaneously the time horizon is long. While not all of these results hold
significantly in all regressions, overall, this evidence is most consistent, or at least not in-
consistent, with a model of non-contractible loyalty. Alternative models either have differing
predictions that are rejected in the data or can explain only subsets of these predictions. No-
tably, although the statistical analysis for each individual regression is not completely free
from concerns regarding endogeneity, the joint evidence across several explanatory variables
appears less likely to be affected by this problem. Nonetheless, other tests and applications
can and should be considered. For example, it would be interesting to analyze intra-agency
hiring policies, but for this, richer data from within agencies is needed. Also, time-varying
data would greatly help. For example, countries which value meritocracy may also value
high loyalty, and a panel setup could aid in filtering out unobserved variables and in (statis-
tically) identifying the effects discussed in this paper. Thus, while the results in this paper
are suggestive, further research can certainly improve our understanding not only of appro-
priate ways of modeling loyalty and competence but also of how countries do (and should)
allocate competence within the public sector.
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Appendix
A.1 Countries
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Kenya, (South) Ko-
rea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Zaire.
A.2 Data on agencies
This data comes from Evans and Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Evans (2000). Respondents
to these authors’ survey were told: “We are interested primarily in what these bureaucracies
looked like in the recent past, roughly 1970–1990. In answering the following questions,
assume that “higher officials” refers to those who hold roughly the top 500 positions in the
core economic agencies [we discussed above].”
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EXAMS Approximately what proportion of the higher officials in these
agencies enter the civil service via a formal examination system?
1 = less than 30%, 2 = 30–60%, 3 = 60–90%, 4 = more than 90%
UNIVERSITY Of those that do not enter via examinations, what proportion have
university or post-graduate degrees?
1 = less than 30%, 2 = 30–60%, 3 = 60–90%, 4 = more than 90%
POWER How likely are ideas and policies initiated by these agencies to prevail?
1 = no more likely than ideas coming out of other parts of the state
bureaucracy
2 = quite likely, even in the face of opposition from other parts of the
bureaucracy, as long as the chief executive is neutral or supportive
3 = under the circumstances above and also sometimes even in the
face of opposition from the chief executive
POLICIES Which of the following descriptions best fits the role of these agencies?
1 = they rarely originate new policies, but are important in turning
policies that originate in the political arena into programs that can be
implemented
2 = some new policies originate inside them and they are important
“filters“ for policy ideas that come from political parties, private elites
and the chief executive, often reshaping these ideas in the process
3 = many new economic policies originate inside them
LVALUE (VALUE OF
LOYALTY)
POWER * POLICIES (This variable is calculated for the present study)
SHORT
(SHORTTIMEHORIZON)
What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical high
level official in one of these agencies during his career?
1 = 1–10 years, 0 = 10 years to entire career
TIMEHORIZON What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical high
level official in one of these agencies during his career?
1 = 1–5 years, 2 = 5–10 years, 3 = 10–20 years, 4 = entire career
POLAPP Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political
appointees (e.g., appointed by the President or Chief Executive)
1 = none, 2 = just agency chiefs, 3 = agency chiefs and vice chiefs,
4 = all of top 2 or 3 levels
PRIVATESECTOR How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to spend
substantial proportions of their careers in the private sector,
interspersing private and public sector activity?
1 = normal, 2 = frequent but not modal, 3 = unusual, 4 = almost
never
PRIVATE-RETIRE How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to have
significant post-retirement careers in the private sector?
1 = normal, 2 = frequent but not modal, 3 = unusual, 4 = almost
never
RELATIVE SALARY How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not including
bribes or other extra-legal sources of income) of higher officials in
these agencies relative to those of private sector managers with roughly
comparable training and responsibilities?
1 = less than 50%, 2 = 50–80%, 3 = 80–90%, 4 = comparable, 5 =
higher
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RELATIVE SALARY
WITH BRIBES
(Follow-up to RELATIVE SALARY): If bribes and other extra-legal
perquisites are included what would the proportion be?
1 = less than 50%, 2 = 50–80%, 3 = 80–90%, 4 = comparable, 5 =
higher
BRIBES Difference between RELATIVE SALARY WITH BRIBES and
RELATIVE SALARY. (This variable is calculated for the present study.)
HISTORYCIVIL (Note: This question refers to the higher Civil Service more broadly,
not just to the top 500 officials in the core agencies.) Since roughly
what date have civil service examinations been in place? (reordered
from the original survey)
1 = 1990–, 2 = 1980–1989, 3 = 1970–1979, 4 = 1950–1969, 5 =
1900–1949, 6 = Pre-1900
POLDEP Are the incumbents of these top positions likely to be moved to
positions of lesser importance when political leadership changes?
1 = almost always, 2 = usually, 3 = sometimes, 4 = rarely
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